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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the modularization in the world auto industry. The modularization
in the industry has involved architectural changes in product, production, and supplier
systems with each region (Japan, Europe and the U.S.A.) emphasizing different
purposes and aspects. As an attempt to understand such multi-faceted, complex
processes coherently, this paper proposes a conceptual framework that sees
development / production activities as interlinked, multiple hierarchies of products,
processes, and inter-firm boundaries. With this framework, drawing on case studies and
questionnaire survey data, the paper examines the on-going processes of modularization
in the industry. It is argued that tensions exist among the three hierarchies, and such
tensions may lead to further changes in product, production and supplier-system
architectures in the auto industry, in a dynamic and path-dependent manner.
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1. INTRODUCTION
     The concept of "modularization" has attracted increasing attention in the auto
industry in the last few years. The meanings and purposes of modularization in this
industry vary between regions and companies. There is no clear-cut definition of the
term shared by the whole industry. Yet, there does exist a feature relatively common
across various practices of modularization in the industry. It entails having larger units
in subassembly and also often involves outsourcing these subassemblies to suppliers (as
most frequently observed in the European auto industry).
     This fact suggests that there are at least three facets in the phenomenon called
“modularization”: 1) “modularization in product architecture” (modularization in
design) which has been discussed quite often in the field of the management of
technology; 2) “modularization in production;” and 3) “modularization in inter-firm
system” (outsourcing subsystems in larger units to outside suppliers). These three facets
have often been mixed up, causing confusion in discussing modularization. While the
European auto industry has been interested mainly in outsourcing, the Japanese has
focused on modularization in production. Neither of them has addressed
“modularization in product architecture.” As we look further into the on-going practices
in the auto industry, however, we can detect some changes that may lead to
modularization in product architecture.
     We observe in the auto industry such complicated, multi-faceted, and sometimes
confusing processes of modularization. If we could present a single conceptual
framework within which all trends in the industry can be analyzed somehow
consistently, it would be a contribution to further our understanding of the concept of
modularization. This is why this paper focuses on the auto industry. This paper also
aims at probing into dynamic interactions and architectural changes between three
systems —— product, production, and inter-firm systems. Since modularization in the
auto industry is still in a fluid, transitional stage at this moment, the industry provides us
with a particularly interesting field where we can witness in real-time such dynamic
interactions and architectural changes.
     The next section of this paper lays out a conceptual framework that sees
development and production activities for automobiles as multiple hierarchies of
product, production, and inter-firm systems. This framework serves as the platform to
be applied for the subsequent analysis. The following section describes the
modularization in the auto industry. We investigate what is actually happening in the
industry and the rationales behind these changes, while comparing the practices of
modularization in the Japanese, European, and the U.S. auto industries.1 We then
discuss how some changes in production and supplier systems would lead to changes in
product architecture. The paper concludes by summarizing our analysis and discussing
some implications for the future of the auto industry.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
                                                
1 This paper is based on the results of a series of interviews with automakers and component suppliers in
Japan and other countries that was carried out from 1999 to 2000 as part of a research project on
“Modularization and Outsourcing” at the MIT's International Motor Vehicle Program. We also conducted
a questionnaire survey of Japanese component suppliers.
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FOR AUTOMOBILES AS MULTIPLE HIERARCHIES
     Before investigating the actual practices of modularization being implemented in the
auto industry, we would like to propose a conceptual framework as the premise for the
analysis. One of this paper’s purposes is to discuss the concepts of “modularization in
product system,” “modularization in production system,” and “modularization in inter-
firm system” within the same framework, and identify the differences and linkages
between them. This framework is based on the concept of “multiple hierarchies.” It sees
development-production activities for automobiles as multiple, interlinked hierarchies.
It contends that the hierarchies in product, production, and inter-firm systems make up
one complex system where the three systems are related with each other (this
framework is based on Fujimoto 1999).
     Let us explain each of the three facets of modularization with this concept of
“multiple hierarchies.” First, “modularization in product” is defined in terms of the
interrelation between the “Product Function Hierarchy” and the “Product Structure
Hierarchy.” We can illustrate such an interrelation with diagrams like those shown in
Figure 1 (1) (Göepfert and Steinbrecher 1999, for example). The left diagram is a
schematic representation of the so-called “integral” product. Since the elements making
up the product function (the left triangle) are interrelated with those making up the
product structure (the right triangle) in a complex manner, the designer of Subsystem
[S1] has to take the following factors into account:
1) functional interdependence with the other subsystems (such as s1←f1←s2, and
s1←f2←s2)
2) structural interdependence with the other subsystems (physical interference, for
example, s1←s2)
3) interdependence with the design of the entire system (consistency with the design of
the whole system, s1←S1←S)
4) interdependence between the sub-functions (such as f1f2, and F1F2).
“Modularization in product” decreases such interdependence between the
concerned elements. It allows one-to-one correspondence between the subsystems and
their functions, and enables, for example, the designer of Subsystem [S1] to focus solely
on Sub-function [F1] and [S] (the structure of the product as a whole). The subsystem
becomes a “module with a self-contained function,” which can be designed more
autonomously. Remaining interdependence after modularization can further be reduced
if the interfaces between the elements are simplified and standardized as much as
possible.
     We can illustrate “modularity in production” with the similar diagrams as shown in
Figure 1 (2). It is comprised of the “Product Structure Hierarchy” (right triangle) and
the “Product Process Hierarchy” (left). In order to simplify our explanation, among the
whole manufacturing processes, we focus here only on assembly work in the“Product
Process Hierarchy.” It is important to note that the “Product Structure Hierarchy” in this
figure, as part of “Multiple Hierarchies of Product Structure and Production Processes,”
and its counterpart in the previous “Multiple Hierarchies of Product Function and
Product Structure” might have different hierarchical patterns. The former hierarchy is
built up in pursuit of “functional independence” of each subsystem (i.e., the degree to
which a function of the product is achieved by a single subsystem), while the latter is
made up for “structural cohesiveness” (i.e., the degree to which a collection of parts can
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be physically handled as one unit).  The latter hierarchy is intended to contribute to
“structurally cohesive modules” which are easy to manage material handling and quality
control. The difference between those two hierarchies can be understood by observing
the parts list for the product design which is not same as the one for production
management.
     The left diagram represents non-modular production processes. Without any
“structurally cohesive large modules,” the product is to be assembled from eight small
modules (s1 to s8) at the same hierarchical level on one long main assembly line. On the
contrary, in the right diagram, there are two structurally-cohesive modules “S1 and S2”
on the right, and two subassembly lines to build them and one short main line for
finished products on the left (remember the famous watchmaker story in Simon 1969).
It can be said that the “Product Structure Hierarchy” with cohesive modules is translated
into the “Product Process Hierarchy” with one main line and two subassembly lines.
     Finally, let us explain “modularization in inter-firm system,” in which outside
suppliers conduct and deliver subassemblies. The inter-firm division of labor in
development and production (an automaker’s boundaries between in-house operations
and outsourcing, or make-or-buy) can be defined for each of all steps of development-
production activities from product function designing, product structure designing,
production process designing, production preparation, to production. Here we focus on
the division of labor in production processes which we often refer to when we talk about
the make-or-buy decisions. That is to draw the boundaries of the involved companies
over the production process hierarchy of the preceding diagram, as shown in Figure 1
(3). “Modularization in inter-firm system,” which has drawn increasing attention in the
European auto industry, entails outsourcing subsystems in large units (cohesive
modules) to suppliers. The left diagram is a schematic representation of production with
a higher in-house ratio, in which small modules (s1 - s8) are delivered by outside
suppliers. On the contrary, the right represents production based on a highly modular
supplier system, in which large modules are assembled by outside suppliers on their
subassembly lines, and are delivered and assembled into finished products on the main
line of the automaker. We can apply the same illustration to describe the outsourcing of
product designing (the so-called “approved drawings” or “black-box components”).
     Overall, the three facets of modularization and their interrelations can be illustrated
within the same framework of multiple hierarchies as shown in the three pairs of
diagrams. Product engineers, process engineers, and purchasing managers must make
decisions about the product and process hierarchies and the inter-firm boundaries, while
securing close coordination between them. It is obvious that these three facets of
modularization must not be mixed up. At the same time, it is also clear that these
decisions are interrelated with each other. They are the processes of making decisions
about interrelated hierarchies of product functions, product structure, and production
processes. There is always a possibility of some inconsistency or conflict between the
decisions. In a sense, the most critical challenge in modularization is how to avoid or
overcome such inconsistency and conflict through coordination.
     We have discussed the three decision-making processes from a rather static point of
view thus far. Such decisions, however, in reality, are probably being made in a
cumulative manner over time in most cases. We therefore have to take “path-
dependency” into account —— the outcome may depend on the specific sequence of
decision-making.
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     The following section probes into the actual practices of “modularization” in both
Western and Japanese auto industries. Let us briefly summarize our analysis
beforehand. Western automakers have a strong inclination toward “modularization in
inter-firm system,” or outsourcing, which has stimulated “modularization in
production.” One of their challenges is to cope with the inconsistency or conflict created
between such “modularization in procurement/production” and “modularization in
product architecture.” Japanese automakers, on the contrary, have focused on in-house
“modularization in production” thus far and have been relatively quiet about aggressive
outsourcing adopted by Western counterparts. Automakers in Japan instead seem to
seek for “modularization in product architecture” facilitated by the need for the
functionality and conformance quality of modules assembled on in-house subassembly
lines. Since Western and Japanese auto industries have been following different paths in
implementing modularization, their product architectures, production process
hierarchies, and boundaries between in-house operations and outsourcing could be
diverse, as they emerge.
3. MODULARIZATION IN THE WORLD AUTO INDUSTRY
3.1.  European and U.S. Auto Industries
     It is two German automakers, Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz (presently Daimler-
Chrysler), that geared up the auto industry's modularization in the mid-1990s. Their new
assembly plants, which started production in 1996 and 197, introduced modularization
on a large scale, specifically at Volkswagen’s plants in Resende (Brazil), Boleslav
(Czech), and Mosel (former East Germany), and Mercedes-Benz's plants in Vance
(U.S.) and Hambach (France).
     These plants share two characteristics. One is that they have assembled cars from
relatively large subassemblies. A car is a system made up of numerous components.
There is a wide choice of managerial units at the intermediate stage in the process of
putting them into a car. These plants have departed from the conventional way of
assembling cars. At conventional plants, individual components —— for example,
instrument panels, gauges, and wire harnesses —— one by one to a vehicle body on the
final assembly line. Instead, at those new plants, these individual components are sub-
assembled on a separate line, and then installed as a module into a body on the final
assembly line. In the framework we discussed in the previous section, this is to redesign
the hierarchy in production processes by setting a new intermediate layer to it (as shown
in the right diagram of Figure 1 (2)). Automakers in the world have divided cars into
many parts in order to make development and production processes manageable. As
some automakers have drastically redesigned the hierarchies in their development and
production processes through modularization, others have also begun exploring new
hierarchies.
     The second characteristic shared by these plants is that they have let outside
suppliers develop and assemble subassemblies. In the previous framework, this means
to narrow the scope of in-house operations in the hierarchy of the inter-firm system
(moving the inter-firm boundaries up to a higher hierarchical level), as shown in the
right diagram of Figure 1 (3). MCC’s plant in Hambach is a typical example of such
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outsourcing. MCC is a joint venture of Mercedes-Benz and SMH (a Swiss watch
manufacturer), which assembles a two-seater small-sized car called “Smart.” A group of
suppliers called as “system partners” surround MCC’s assembly plant. They build large
modules such as cockpit modules, rear axle modules, and door modules, and deliver
them directly to MCC’s final assembly line. MCC even outsources body welding and
painting, which traditionally automakers carry out in-house. Automakers in the United
States have not yet become as aggressive in pursuing modularization as these German
companies have. However, they have indicated their intention of letting their so-called
“full-service” system suppliers handle larger sets of components in development and
production.
     There are three main reasons why Western automakers have been expanding the
scope of outsourcing. First, they want to take advantage of the suppliers’ lower labor
costs. Second, they can cut investment costs and risk by giving more important
responsibilities to the suppliers.2 Third, these moves toward modularization have also
been accelerated by their policy of reducing the number of the first-tier suppliers.  This
idea was originally taken from the Japanese automakers' approach (Clark and Fujimoto
1991, Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, Nishiguchi 1994). However, compared to their
Japanese rivals, European manufacturers are already letting their suppliers handle larger
modules. It seems that a strong sense of crisis that it has been difficult to make profits
from their car business underlies their aggressive outsourcing. In other words, they have
been seeking outsourcing as part of an attempt to redesign “business architecture”
(Fujimoto, Takeishi, and Aoshima 2001).
     Responding to and promoting such demand from manufacturers, there have been a
growing number of mergers and acquisitions among suppliers in the United States and
Europe. They aim at establishing themselves as module suppliers and expanding
business with major automakers by becoming qualified to manage the development and
production of a larger set of components as a module.3
     There are, however, some cases where module suppliers are assigned only to sub-
assemble the components, each of which is still manufactured and designed by the
incumbent suppliers. In these cases automakers still maintain control over the choice of
suppliers for the individual components, as well as the management of their prices,
quality, and design. Automakers have chosen to do so partly because they think that
module suppliers are not capable of handling all aspects of the module. They are also
concerned that extensive outsourcing to a limited number of suppliers may make the
                                                
2 It is told, for example, that assembly plants actively outsourcing larger modules to suppliers can *gain
pay back from their investment even on a relatively small scale of production. However, some
interviewees at European and American automakers pointed out that the saving of labor and investment
costs would not necessarily be very important advantages of modularization. Labor costs do not account
for a large portion of total production costs in automobile manufacturing. Further, if suppliers’
subassembly plants are adjacent to an automaker’s final assembly plant, there exists a strong chance for
the wage gap between the assembler and suppliers to be narrowed. It is also true that investment costs
shared by suppliers would be reflected in the prices of their parts. For suppliers whose scale of business is
relatively small, it is more likely that they have to pay higher capital costs than their customers.
3 See, for example, Automotive News (June 22, 1998). Lear Corporation is among such suppliers.
Originally a seat manufacturer, the company acquired Ford’s seat production division in 1993. Since then
the company has branched out into new component areas by buying 12 suppliers, and has grown into a
leading supplier whose products cover entire car interiors, including instrument panels, door trims, roof
trims, rearview mirrors, carpets, and air conditioners.
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costs and technology of components unknown to themselves, reduce competitive
pressure for suppliers, and thus weaken their own negotiation power. Nevertheless, such
limited outsourcing probably only offers the limited advantage of cheap labor. It does
not appeal to suppliers either because they are treated only as simple subcontractors
with little added value while asked to invest lots of money and take risks. Automakers
are still in the process of exploring where they should draw the boundaries in their
development and production activities.
3.2.  Japanese Auto Industry
     Unlike the U.S. and European auto industries, the Japanese auto industry has shown
few visible initiatives toward modularization. But when we looked closely into what
Japanese companies are doing, through interviews and a questionnaire survey, we found
out that they were dealing with the issue in a different style with different aims.
     First, let us look at the results of our questionnaire survey.4 We conducted a
questionnaire survey with 153 first-tier suppliers in February and March 1999. In this
survey, the term “modularization” was not used because there was no commonly shared
definition of it. Instead, a number of questions about several important aspects of
modularization were asked to capture recent changes in the industry. The respondents
were asked the degree of changes over the last four years (a typical model changeover
cycle) in 19 measures regarding design and production processes of their components.
     A factor analysis of the responses has identified the following four factors: 1)
component standardization, 2) shift to integral architecture, 3) functional
independence/interface simplification, and 4) expansion of the subassembly scope. The
results of this factor analysis suggest that it is difficult to generalize what is meant by
modularization because it involves multiple dimensions.5
     Table 1 shows the average scores of the answers. The biggest change over the last
four years was “shift to integral architecture.” The functions assigned to individual parts
had become more complex (Item 17), and the need for structural or functional
coordination with other components had increased (Items 18 and 19). These changes
were in an opposite direction to modularization. Note that we see signs of
modularization in architecture in the increase of component sharing within each
customer (automaker) (Items 6, 7, 13 and 14). Yet, the scope of component sharing was
quite limited to among variations of a particular model, or at most, among different
models of an automaker. There had been almost no attempts for component sharing
across different automakers (Items 8 and 15). Further, there had been only little progress
in the functional independence of components and the simplification of interfaces
(Items 11, 12 and 16). There had been a very small number of cases where automakers
had asked their suppliers to sub-assembly a larger set of components (Items 2, 3 and 4).
     To sum up, the product architecture had become more integral, although some
automakers had shown some interest in the use of standardized components and
interfaces. On the other hand, there had been almost no progress in the type of
modularization prevalent in the European and the U.S. auto industry, namely
outsourcing of subassemblies in larger units to suppliers.
                                                
4 For the details of the questionnaire, see Fujimoto, Matsuo and Takeishi (1999).
5 The factor analysis was done by Ku and is reported in Ku (2000).
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     However, the above survey tells only about what component suppliers saw. If we
look at what is happening inside automakers, a different picture appears. Figure 2 shows
the results of our interviews (conducted from March to July, 1999) with eight Japanese
automakers, about to what extent components around the instrument panels were sub-
assembled before installed on the main assembly line for some of their models. It plots
the number of component types sub-assembled for the model (vertical axis) and the year
in which the model in question was introduced to the market (horizontal axis). The
scores were all mean-centered for adjustment across automakers. We could see a
positive correlation. The newer the model was, the wider the scope of the subassembly.
In other words, there has been some progress in having subassemblies in larger units
inside automobile assemblers.
     Then, why have Japanese automakers promoted the in-house use of subassemblies?
They have done so partly because they were stimulated by American and European
rivals who have been actively adopting modularization. But some automakers are
interested in modularization with a different perspective. It is based on their pursuit of
“autonomous and complete” assembly lines.
     Japanese automakers have traditionally built highly integral assembly lines, as
epitomized by the famous Toyota's lines, for maximum efficiency. In order to eliminate
any non-value-adding time, “muda,” they have combined different tasks flexibly. The
improvement of the efficiency of each final assembly line as a whole has always been a
number one priority. For the same reason, Japanese automakers have had their workers
trained for multiple tasks and skills (“tanoko”). In short, the hierarchy shown in the left
diagram of Figure 1 (2) has been most favored. The sequence of assembly processes and
worker assignments have always been rearranged to achieve the maximum efficiency
under changing situations. The introduction of a subassembly line, which involves the
isolation of a particular set of tasks from the main line, as shown in the left diagram,
hinders flexible task rearrangement for optimizing the whole system. For example,
those workers assigned to the subassembly line are not to help their colleagues at the
main line even when a problem occurs. On this account, they have traditionally been
reluctant to have subassembly lines in their plants. But they have begun changing their
views since the early 1990s for several reasons.
    First, automakers have placed a greater importance on their employees’ satisfaction
from their work. This change originated in the serious shortage of workers during the
bubble economy (Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994). It has also been influenced by the
necessity of dealing with the growing number of female and elderly workers. The
adoption of subassembly lines improves the workers’ satisfaction in two respects. First,
working for a subassembly line allows workers to maintain a comfortable working
position (better ergonomics). Suppose your job is to attach various components around
the instrument panel. If you work on a main line, you may have to stand in a torturous
position, leaning over the panel in the car. By contrast, if you work on a subassembly
line, you can maintain a relatively comfortable working position, standing while
attaching all the components to the panel. In addition, it is considered that handling a
functionally related set of tasks helps you understand the significance of your work.
This would motivate and satisfy workers.
     Second, they have placed a greater importance on self-contained quality control
system. According to this idea, the quality of each subassembly is inspected upon its
completion, not on the final line as part of a finished product, in order to find defects at
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the earliest stage possible. The adoption of self-contained quality control has facilitated
the adoption of subassemblies to be inspected upon completion. This is closely related
to the significance of work mentioned above. If you can check the quality of a
subassembly you have just completed, you can gain a sense of your work's significance
and accomplishment.
With an increasing emphasis on workers’ satisfaction and self-contained quality
control, Japanese automakers have been replacing their conventional integral lines with
new self-contained lines, and thus been adopting more and more subassemblies.6
However, they have been reluctant to outsource the subassemblies to outside suppliers,
as confirmed in the results of the previous questionnaire survey as well as our
interviews with automakers. This is a big difference compared to the European auto
industry where modularization often proceeds with outsourcing.7
     There are some reasons for this reluctance. First, the cost advantage in outsourcing
modules is not so great in Japan because the wage gap between automakers and the
first-tier suppliers is narrow compared to Western counterparts. Second, in order to have
outsourced subassemblies delivered in sequence to the main line on short lead times, the
suppliers’ shops should be located within a very short distance from the assembling
plants. Yet investment opportunities for building such new facilities are currently quite
limited in Japan. Even if this is possible, automakers are concerned that each plant
might rely too much on the particular suppliers selected, and thus its competitive
pressure toward them might be reduced. Third, automakers have been doubtful about
the capability of suppliers to handle a larger scope of tasks since Japanese suppliers
have long specialized in the development and production of individual functional
components. It is also true that Japanese automakers have a dislike for losing
knowledge about the technology and costs of any parts involved. The absence of those
component suppliers who have proactively had mergers and acquisitions in order to
develop and produce larger modules as emerging in the United States and Europe, has
also kept Japanese automakers primarily focused on in-house subassemblies.
4.  REDEFINING PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE
     As we have discussed thus far, the modularization in the auto industry has centered
upon the redefinition of hierarchies in production system and inter-firm system. The
former entails the expanded use of subassemblies, the change common in the Japanese,
European and U.S. auto industries. The latter involves the expanded use of outsourcing,
which has been prevalent in Europe and the U.S., but inconspicuous in Japan.
     The redefinition of hierarchies in production and inter-firm systems is essentially
different from modularization in product system (as shown in Figure (1)). In the first
place, cars are usually categorized as relatively integral products in terms of product
architecture (Fujimoto 2001), and thus are difficult to be modularized further. But if we
probe into what is happening in the industry, we observe some movements in which the
                                                
6 Some automakers have also tried to divide their main lines into some self-contained sub-blocks. For this
new assembly system, see Fujimoto 1999.
7 Some European automakers, however, put emphasis on in-house production. For example, Audi, a
company of the Volkswagen Group, focuses on in-house production at its Ingolstadt Plant, Germany. It
outsourced some subassemblies to outside suppliers, but plans to have them back to in-house operations.
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redefinition of hierarchies in production and inter-firm systems may lead to
modularization in product architecture.
      Among such movements is the redesigning of the components necessitated by the
adoption of subassemblies, which has been addressed by Japanese automakers. The use
of subassemblies has some disadvantages. A subassembly built from many components
is difficult to handle because of its size and weight. Such a subassembly is also difficult
to be fitted perfectly onto other subassemblies or the body. Accuracy in assembling
work is difficult to achieve with subassemblies compared to that of smaller, individual
components. If some additional parts or fixtures are needed only to ensure ease of
handling and accuracy, it would end up with an unacceptable increase in costs and
weight. Furthermore, unless the assignment of functions to some components is
redefined, it may be often impossible to check the quality of a sub-assembled module.8
     In order to solve these problems brought up by modularization, Japanese automakers
have put great emphasis on redesigning the components within a subassembly module.
Such efforts include the integration of some components into others for reduced cost
and weight, and the re-assignment of functions to realize the self-contained quality
control (for example, making the functions of an instrument panel module more
independent so that the quality of its electric system can be tested independently). These
attempts are nothing but the redefinition of product architecture. The integration of
some components into others involves making the product architecture of certain sets of
components more integral. Making the function of a set of components more
independent entails the modularization of the set.
     Such attempts to redesign have been triggered by the redefinition of the hierarchies
in production systems, and may lead to the redefinition of organizational boundaries
(following the path: “Modularization in Production System”→“Modularization in
Product Architecture”→“Modularization in Inter-firm System”) (See Figure 3).
According to Fujimoto and Ge (2001), the “approved drawings” (or “black-box
components”) are more likely to be adopted for certain parts for which the
responsibilities for quality control can be clearly defined. In other words, such parts can
be outsourced because the functions assigned to them can be managed by outside
suppliers as independent, self-contained units. If the redefinition of product architecture
allows us to redefine the scope of quality control responsibilities in larger units,
development and production within that scope could be outsourced more easily to
outside suppliers. As a result, outsourcing of development and production would be
further promoted.
     Some Western automakers include “a testable set of components” as the important
conditions for modularization. This suggests that the assignment of independent
(testable) functions has been treated as an important requirement for outsourcing. This
implies the sequence that “Modularization in Inter-firm and Production Systems”
facilitates “Modularization in Product Architecture” (Figure 3).
     Probably the most outstanding example of products developed in this manner is
“Smart” being manufactured in the aforementioned MCC plant. This car is comprised of
                                                
8 It is also true that Japanese-style production, which often uses mixed-model assembly lines (in which
different models are assembled on the same line), prevents automakers from adopting subassemblies.
Suppose you decided to use subassemblies for the production of a certain model, *then assembly work on
the main line would be quite uneven between different models, making the operation inefficient. Note,
however, that this problem will be solved over time.
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a highly unique body frame called a TRIDION cell and plastic body panels. Unlike the
integral architecture of ordinary passenger cars with a mono-cock body, Smart’s product
architecture was designed to be built from modules. Bosch, one of the largest
component suppliers in the world, once pointed out that one of the requirements for
successful modular production was to design a car optimized for modules, and cited
Smart as an example. The development of such a car can be described as a process in
which the division of labor with outside suppliers expedites the redefinition of the
relationships between functions and structures to define explicit conditions for contract
and evaluation measures, and, as a result, the architecture of the product becomes
modularized.
     Product architecture would be redefined in the process of modularization in both the
Japanese and European auto industries. But the difference in the paths they have
followed might make their new architecture different in nature (Figure 3). In Japan, the
redefinition of product architecture has been addressed under the leadership of
automakers in cooperation with multiple suppliers.9 In Europe, automakers have often
outsourced a large set of components to a single supplier (who has become a module
supplier through mergers and acquisitions), and the redefinition of product architecture
is pursued according to the inter-firm boundaries in this relationship. If knowledge of
the entire product is the most important requirement for the redefinition of its
architecture, the automaker-led style of the Japanese auto industry might have an
advantage. On the other hand, the supplier-led redefinition of architecture in Europe and
the United States might bring about more innovative architecture that no assemblers
could have ever recognized.
      It should be noted that modularization in this industry is basically adopted for
individual models. Even Western automakers use particular modules for particular
plants or models. There has been no case of adopting the same modules across different
models or plants. The same applies to subassemblies and design rationalization in the
Japanese auto industry. In this sense, the modularization in the auto industry is
essentially different from open modularization observed in personal computers,
bicycles, and stereo component systems. If an automaker outsources design tasks in
very large units to one particular supplier, the free hand given to the supplier might
allow it to pursue the component sharing and standardization to a certain extent.
However, since the optimization of each model for better product integrity is of great
importance in the industry, we have not seen any extensive attempt toward the
commonalization and standardization of interfaces across different automakers.10
                                                
9 Since suppliers have extensive knowledge of individual components, their cooperation is indispensable
for the development of any modules, even if its subassembly is done in-house by an automaker. There is a
unique approach called "kyogyo" in the Japanese auto industry in which a number of suppliers work
together to develop sets of components in larger units, under the leadership of an automaker. For
examples of design streamlining through “kyogyo,” see “Nikkei Mechanical,” January 1999.
10 The auto industry’s resistance to standardization has a long history. In 1910, the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) proposed the standardization of parts across the industry. It wanted to make assembly
work more efficient by ensuring compatibility between different parts of different automakers. While
relatively small-sized automakers supported the proposal, it did not become a reality due to resistance
from major assemblers such as Ford and GM. They did not want to lose the strong position they had
established (economy of scale) and stuck to their own standards (Langlois and Robertson 1992).
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5. DISCUSSION: DYNAMICS OF MODULARIZATION IN THE AUTO
INDUSTRY
      Modularization in the auto industry is still in the trial and error stage. The industry
began addressing the issue only several years ago. The contexts and purposes of
modularization vary across regions and companies. So it is still quite uncertain and
unpredictable how it will be evolved and what impacts it will have. Our argument is
therefore no more than speculation. Yet, it would be safe to say that on-going processes
concerning modularization provide us with some interesting cases to explore the
dynamics surrounding architectural changes.
      What lies in the center of the dynamics is interactions between production system,
inter-firm system, and product architecture. Changes in the hierarchies in production
system and/or inter-firm system cause tension in their relationships with product
architecture, and thus encourage the redefinition of product architecture.
      Baldwin and Clark (2000) pointed out that the issue of modularization involves
“modularity in design,” “modularity in use,” and “modularity in production” (though
their discussion primarily focused on “modularity in design”). Sako and Murray (1999)
argued that each of these has its own optimal architecture, and thus well-balanced
relationships among them should be maintained in the process of modularization. This
suggests that these three aspects of modularization are correlated with each other and
close coordination among them is necessary. Sako and Murray further pointed out that
coordination has to be secured between product architecture and organizational
architecture (intra-firm and inter-firm organizations) as well. Echoing with their
argument, this paper also suggests that changes in inter-firm system might lead to
changes in product architecture. It is well known that modularization in product
architecture sometimes changes the structure of the division of labor in the industry
(from a vertical industry structure to a horizontal industry structure) (Fine 1998). This
paper suggests that the relationship between product architecture and inter-firm system
is two-way —— not only the former influences the latter, but also the latter has some
impact on the former.
      As argued in Section 2 on the analytical framework, the hierarchies in product
system, namely hierarchies in product structure and product function, correspond to
those in production system and inter-firm system. Hierarchical structure of a complex
system is formed as a method to rationalize the division of labor (Simon 1969). Each of
product, production, and inter-firm systems has its own logic of the division of labor.
Hierarchies in production system and inter-firm system change in their own contexts
(for example, the improvement of workers’ satisfaction, the utilization of the wage gap
between different companies, the reallocation of risk and investment burden, and so on).
And such changes in production and inter-firm systems would demand changes in
product architecture. Conditions within design activities are not a sole factor for
changes in product architecture. European automakers, for example, are exploring new
architectures across inter-firm, production, and product systems in search of a more
profitable business model (though the outcomes are still yet to be seen).
      Modularization in the auto industry seems to proceed with hierarchical changes in
each of product, production, and inter-firm systems in its own context and with its own
logic, and at the same time evolve through dynamic interactions among these multiple
systems of hierarchies. If this is the case, the key to successful modularization for
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automakers probably lies in close cooperation and coordination between their
development, production and purchasing functions, as well as with their suppliers.
      Given different business environments, different capabilities and strategies, and
different paths toward modularization, we might see the co-existence of various patterns
of modularization in the world auto industry. Also, there could be a scenario for multiple
patterns of modularization being used for different product lines and market segments.
Or, if any particular pattern would command an outstanding competitive leadership, the
entire industry may be converged into that pattern of modularization. The future of
modularization depends on which pattern would allow automakers to design and
produce cars with greatest values for consumers.
      The future of technological innovations in the medium or long term is also
important. The urgent need to protect the environment has accelerated the competition
for a new power source (such as hybrid engines and fuel cells) to replace the
conventional internal-combustion engines. With rapidly advancing information and
communication technologies, the development of ITS (Intelligent Transportation
System) has also been progressing. The growing importance of information
technologies in vehicles has made the role of software much more important, and thus
may facilitate a kind of modularization through the separation of hardware and
software. When those new technologies are put into practical use, the architecture of
cars will have to be totally redesigned and such changes will inevitably influence
production and inter-firm systems as well. It is anticipated, under such circumstances,
new architectures (for product, production and inter-firm systems) of the auto industry
will be established through dynamic interactions between on-going attempts of
modularization and emerging new technological innovations.
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Figure 1 Multiple Hierarchies of Product, Production and Supply Systems
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Table 1 Recent Changes of Component Development and Production
In the Japanese Auto Industry
(Results of a Questionnaire Survey with First-tier Suppliers)
Note: This table is based on the results of a questionnaire survey with 153 Japanese first-tier suppliers,
which was conducted in February and March 1999, in Japan. The respondents answered the degree of
changes in each item. Scores were: “changed” = 2, “no changes” = 0, “changed adversely” = -2. Columns
are the four factors identified by a factor analysis. ● indicates that the item had a strong correlation with the
corresponding factor. The scores in the bottom rows are the average scores for the items with a strong
correlation with the factor. See Fujimoto, Matsuo, and Takeishi (1998) for the details of the questionnaire
survey, and Ku (2000) for the results of the factor analysis.
Source: Questionnaire Survey with First-tier Suppliers in Japan (1999)
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Figure 2 Changes in Scope of Subassembly Around Instrument Panels
at Japanese Automakers' Assembly Plants
This figure plots the relationship between the number of components sub-assembled around the
instrument panels, and the year in which the model in question was introduced to market.
The scores are all mean-centered within each automaker. For the year of market introduction, the score
measures a difference between the year in which the model in question was launched and the average
year in which the automaker' s sample models were launched. The higher the score, the newer the model
is among the automaker's models in the sample. For the scope of subassembly, the score measures a
difference between the number of components sub-assembled for the model in question and the average
number of components sub-assembled for the automaker’s sample models. The higher the score, the
larger the scope of subassembly is among the automaker’s models in the sample.
Components examined for subassembly include: instrument panels, gauges, meter panels, glove
compartments, wire harnesses, air conditioner switches, air conditioner units, air conditioner blowers, air
conditioner ducts, air vents, audio systems, navigation systems, steering shafts, steering columns, steering
switches, ignitions, column shifts, air bags (for drivers), air bags (for passengers), cup holders, ashtrays,
pedals, and cross members (23 components).
Source: Interviews with Eight Japanese Automakers (conducted in spring and summer, 1999).
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Figure 3  Dynamics of Modularization in the Auto Industry
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